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The paper aims at comparing the formal and informal labour markets in the Central 
and Eastern European new EU Member States and candidate countries of the 
European Union. First, the current situation of the labour market is described, 
focusing on the recent developments since the breaking up of the East. Then the 
policy design of these labour markets is depicted and its effects on formal and 
informal labour markets. The most important challenges for employment policy as 
well as the effects of enlargement on the labour markets are analysed. The paper 
ends with a short summary. 
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1. Introduction 
Ten new countries have recently joined the EU in the largest enlargement the EU has 
ever seen so far. But the enlargement is not only important in terms of its size, but it 
is even more remarkable that new Member States have acceded which only some 
years ago started the transition from a planned to a market economy. The accession 
to the EU, and even more, the still incomplete transition to market economies poses 
an important challenge to the new and future Member States - but also to the EU and 
its old members. The transition is accompanied by an enormous restructuring of the 
economy and important income and job losses. These losses are partly 
compensated by an increase in the shadow economy.  
 
The paper aims at comparing the formal and informal labour markets in the central 
and eastern new EU Member States and candidate countries on one hand and in the 
EU-15 on the other.
  1 In chapter 2, the current situation of the labour market is 
described, focusing on the recent developments since the breaking-up of the East 
and on actual data on the labour markets. Chapter 3 describes the policy design and 
its effects on formal and informal labour markets. It deals separately with factors 
influencing labour demand and labour supply and finally tackles those policies which 
are crucial for a match of demand and supply. In chapter 4, based on the description 
of labour market trends and labour market policy, the main challenges for the 
employment policy is summarised. Chapter 5 concentrates on the consequences of 
enlargement on the labour markets in old and new European Member States. Finally 
chapter 6 gives a short summary.   
 
 
2. The (formal and informal) labour markets: development and 
current situation 
 
The labour markets of the former centrally planned economies on the eve of 
transition were characterised by full employment (i.e. no open unemployment). 
Overstaffing, i.e. hidden unemployment, has been estimated to have been as high as 
30%.  Low wages had a “demotivating effect on workers”. Firms rarely laid off 
workers and, as open unemployment was virtually zero, an unemployment security 
system was redundant and hence non-existent. Where the structural division of 
labour is concerned, employment was concentrated in heavy industries, usually in 
large conglomerations, and in the public sector.
2  
 
Most new Member States and candidate economies experienced substantial falls in 
GDP and wages as well as a pronounced decrease of employment at the initial stage 
of transition, with smaller declines in labour productivity. Stagnant unemployment 
accompanying the restructuring of the economies was another key feature of the 
transition process. There are, however, a few exceptions to this pattern: The Czech 
                                            
1 Two new EU Member States, namely Cyprus and Malta, and a candidate country, namely Turkey, 
are left out of consideration as they do not share the communist experience with the other new 
Member States and candidate countries.  
2 See IMF, 2001, and Nesperova, 2002.    3 
Republic experienced an exceptionally long period of low unemployment and Estonia 
achieved significant labour reallocation from the beginning of the transition process.
3  
The transition period was/is characterised by job shedding in the public sector and 
with some delay, job creation in the private sector – with an increased incidence of 
temporary (frictional) unemployment and a significant level of structural 
unemployment. The temporary mismatch between labour demand and supply was/is 
due to the length of time taken to develop new private enterprises and the process of 
privatisation of enterprises. Employment losses were transformed to a large extent 
into economic inactivity which concerned, in particular, less productive workers.
4 
 
The current employment rates of the new EU Member States and eastern European 
candidate countries and the EU average (for EU-15 and EU-25) are listed in the 
following table: 
 
Table 1: Employment rates 2002 
 total  male  female  older 
(55-64 years)
Bulgaria  50.6 53.7 47.5  27.0 
Czech Republic  65.4 73.9 57.0  40.8 
Estonia  62.0 66.5 57.9  51.6 
Hungary  56.2 62.9 49.8  25.6 
Lithuania  59.9 62.7 57.2  41.6 
Latvia  60.4 64.3 56.8  41.7 
Poland  51.5 56.9 46.2  26.1 
Romania  57.6 63.6 51.8  37.3 
Slovenia  63.4 68.2 58.6  24.5 
Slovak Republic  56.8 62.4 51.4  22.8 
EU-25  62.8 71.0 54.3  38.7 
EU-10 
Average

















Source: Eurostat, May 2004 
The employment rate is calculated by dividing the number of persons aged 15 to 64 in employment by 
the total population of the same age group. The indicator is based on the EU Labour Force Survey. 
Employed population consists of those persons who during the reference week did any work for pay or 
profit for at least one hour, or were not working but had jobs from which they were temporarily absent. 
 
Generally speaking, total and male employment rates tend to be lower than in the 
EU-15. However, the new EU Member States and candidate countries perform 
relatively better what concerns female employment. Concerning the employment of 
older workers, the performance is mixed, the new Member States and candidate 
countries tend, however, to have employment rates at the lower end of the EU-range.  
 
The European Council in Lisbon in March 2000 set an overall goal for the European 
Economy "to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
                                            
3 See Boeri, Terrell, 2002. 
4 For an overview of the evolution of labour market challenges see Boeri, Terrell, 2002; IMF, 2001, 
Nesporova, 2002. 
5 All averages given in this paper are weighted averages (according to the magnitude of the country).     4 
in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion." Moreover, it has set goals concerning the participation in 
the labour market:  
•  to raise the employment rate to 70% by 2010 and 
•  to increase the number of women in employment to more than 60% by 2010. 
In Stockholm, intermediate targets have been agreed on: 
•  to raise the employment rate to 67% by 2005 and 
•  to increase the number of women in employment to 57% by 2005. 
Finally, a goal for the participation of older workers was introduced at the meeting of 
the European Council in Stockholm: 
•  to increase the employment rate among older women and men (55-64) to 50% by 
2010. 
 
Table 2: Increase of employment rates from the Europen Council in Lisbon 
until now 
  Total employment rates  Female employment rates Employment rates of 
older workers 
  EU-15 EU-25 EU-15 EU-25 EU-15 EU-25 
2000  63,4 62,4 54,1 53,6 37,8 36,6 
2001  64,1 62,8 55,0 54,3 38,8 37,4 
2002  64,2 62,8 55,6 54,7 40,1 38,7 
2003  64,3 62,9 56,0 55,0 41,7 40,2 
target 2005  67,0 57,0  - 
target 2010  70,0 60,0 50,0 
For definitions, see table 1. 
 
In the enlarged EU, it has even become more difficult to reach these targets. From 
table 2, one can conclude that the targets for 2005 are not within reach. Since the 
European Council in Lisbon, the employment rates have risen but only very slowly. 
As policies have not changed fundamentally, it cannot be expected that the 
development of the employment rates will improve dramatically. This makes it 
unlikely, too, that the target values for 2010 will be reached. Only very hard efforts 
could provide a chance that the EU will not fail in reaching the goals.   
 
Table 3 shows the total unemployment rates in 2002. The highest unemployment 
rates in the central and eastern European countries of concern exceed the upper 
bounds for the old EU countries. Moreover, in contrast to the old EU countries, 
unemployment seems to have risen in many countries since mid 1990s. This is even 
more true for long term unemployment. One can probably conclude that the structural 
problems in the labour market are more pervasive in the new EU Members and 
candidate countries than in the old EU Member States. These structural problems 
are – in addition to the kind of structural problems and resulting unemployment in the 
old EU Member States (such as due to globalisation or automatisation) – connected 
to the still incomplete transition of firms and industries. Unemployment has increased 
during the period of transition as firms have been overstaffed during the Communist 
area. The process of restructuring makes (temporary) unemployment inevitable. A 
prolongation of the Communist situation of non-open unemployment, however, would 
make the transition an even longer-lasting and deeper-hurting process.  
Unemployment in general and long-term unemployment in particular are higher 
among low educated and low skilled persons. The same is true for ethnic minorities 
and younger persons. In more than half of the new EU Member States and candidate    5 
countries, unemployment rates of women are lower than for men, which is quite in 
contrast to most old EU countries. Women, however, suffer more from long-term 
unemployment than men. 
 
Table 3: Unemployment 2002 
 total  male  female  long-term* 
Bulgaria  17.8 18.5 17.0  11.9 
Czech Republic  7.3 6.0 9.9  3.7 
Estonia  9.5 10.1  8.1  4.8 
Hungary  5.6 6.0 5.1  2.4 
Lithuania  13.6 13.7 13.4  7.0 
Latvia  12.6 13.6 11.4  5.8 
Poland  19.8 19.0 20.7  10.9 
Romania  7.5 7.8 7.1  3.8 
Slovenia  6.1 5.8 6.5  3.5 
Slovak Republic  18.7 18.6 18.9  12.1 
EU-25  8.8 8.0 9.8  3.9 
EU-15 

















Source: Eurostat, May 2004 
Unemployment rates represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. The labour 
force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise 
persons aged 15 to 74 who were: a) without work during the reference week, b) currently available for 
work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment before the end of the two weeks 
following the reference week, c. actively seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the four weeks 
period ending with the reference week to seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a 
job to start later, i.e. within a period of, at most, three months. Long-term unemployed are already 
unemployed for 12 months and more. 
Where sectoral developments are concerned, most countries experienced a fall in 
the still very large agricultural sector and in the industrial sector. Although a rise in 
employment in the services sector has already been observed, the services sector is 
still viewed as the most likely source of new jobs.  
 
The size of the shadow economy in the central and eastern European EU Member 
States and candidate countries amounts to on average 31% of the official GDP. The 
highest shadow economy has Latvia, followed by Bulgaria and Romania. The lowest 
shadow economy is estimated in the Slovakand the Czech Republics.  
 
Table 4: The size of the shadow (and official) economy– in % of GNP 





Economy in % 







GNP per capita 
Bulgaria 116.7  36.9  43.1  560.9 
Czech Republic  500.1  19.1  95.5  1002.8 
Hungary 440.6  25.1  110.6  1182.2 
Latvia 71.8  39.9  28.6  1165.1 
Lithuania 111.2  30.3  33.7  887.8 
Poland 1568.2  27.6  432.8  1156.4    6 
Romania 363.8  34.4  125.2  574.5 
Slovak 
Republic 
187.7 18.9  35.5  699.3 
Slovenia 180.7  27.1  49.0  2723.6 
AVERAGE  279.4 31.0  76.9  910.2 
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank data, Washington D.C., 2002. 
Methods used to calculate the shadow economy are the currency demand and the dymimic approach. 
 
The size of the shadow economy in terms of value added and the size of the shadow 
economy labor force are, of course, only rough calculations and the error margin is at 
least +/- 15%. This is true for all calculations, concerning the shadow economy in 
terms of value added or in terms of the labour market.
6 The estimation method has 
been the DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple indicators multiple causes) method, i.e. a latent 
estimator approach and values using the physical input method for some countries, 
like Bulgaria and Croatia.
7 The values reportet in table 4 are of similar magnitude with 
the values obtained by other authors (see e.g. Lacko, 2000, and Alexeev and Pyle, 
2003). Of course, the values differ with respect to the different estimation procedures. 
That is the reason, why in this table only estimates of the DYMIMIC methods, we 
think the most reliable, are presented.
8 
 
The shadow economy in terms of value added is quite sizeable, but also the shadow 
economy
9 labour force is quite large in all these countries. The shadow economy 
labour force has been calculated by assuming a certain shadow economy wage rate 
and subtracting 1/3 of the shadow economy value added, assuming that this is 
material. If we then look at the shadow economy labour force, Latvia and Bulgaria 
have the highest shares. In general, these figures demonstrate that the shadow 
economy is a major factor in the economies of these transition countries. Moreover, 
the large size of the shadow economy leads to the conclusion that official figures may 
be biased.  
 
Table 5: The size of the shadow (and official) economy labour market 







labour force 2000 
in % of working 
age population 
Bulgaria 5563  8167  31.0 
Czech Republic  7165  10273  12.9 
Hungary 6856  10022  21.4 
Latvia 1609  2372  30.1 
Lithuania 2482  3695  20.9 
Poland 26555  38650  21.3 
Romania 15355  22435  25.6 
                                            
6 These calculations are taken from Schneider, 2003b.  
7 Values using the physical input method, came from Johnson et al. (1997, table 1, pp.182-183), as 
well as from Lackó, 2000. 
8 For a detailed discussion about the estimation procedures compare Schneider, 2003b, and 
Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004. 
9 The calculation in these paper as in other papers is done in the following way: 1.) Having some 
knowledge about the shadow economy wage rates is used. 2.) From the overall value added figure 
from the shadow economy, the values of the materials subtracted, so that only the value added in 
terms of labour remains. 3.) This figure is divided by this wage rate,and gives millions of hours which 
is then converted into full-time-jobs.     7 
Slovak Republic  3732  5402  17.1 
Slovenia 1396  1988  22.4 
AVERAGE 6336  9211  26.7 
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank data, Washington D.C., 2002. 
Methods used to calculate the shadow economy are the currency demand and the dymimic approach. 
 
Illicit work can take many shapes. The underground use of labour may consist of a 
second job after (or even during) regular working hours. A second form is shadow 
economy work by individuals who do not participate in the official labour market. A 
third component is the employment of people, who are not allowed to work in the 
official economy (e.g. clandestine or illegal immigrants). Empirical research on the 
shadow economy labour market is even more difficult than of the shadow economy 
on the value added, since one has very little knowledge about how many hours an 
average “shadow economy worker” is actually working (from full time to a few hours, 
only). Hence, it is difficult to provide empirical facts.  
 
 




3.1. Labour demand 
Labour demand is heavily influenced by the costs of labour. These do not only 
comprise net wages, but also taxes and other non-wage costs (such as social 
security contributions). Moreover, any kind of regulation can be seen as a cost factor 
by firms. 
 
3.1.1. Labour costs 
Labour costs per working hour including non-wage labour costs in the central and 
eastern European countries are much lower than in the old EU countries, with the 
exception of Slovenia. Slovenian labour costs exceed those in Portugal where the 
lowest value within the EU-15 can be observed. 
 
Table 6: Hourly labour costs 2000 in Euro 
Bulgaria 1.35 















                                            
10 See Burger (2003) for further details.    8 
Source: Eurostat, 2003 
 
The tax burden is an important component of the total labour costs. The tax wedge in 
the new EU Member States and candidate countries does not exceed the highest 
EU-15 values, which is reached in Belgium (with one exception for Hungary – see 
table 7). The tax wedge for an average production worker wage earner amounts to 
55.6% in Belgium. This is relatively high compared to the eastern countries with tax 
wedges of 42.1 (Slovak Republic) and 52.6% (Hungary). 
 
Table 7: Tax burden – Average personal income tax and social security 
contribution rates on gross labour income 
  % average production worker wage 
  67% 100%  133%  167% 
Czech 
Republic 
41.6 43.0 44.3 45.3 
Hungary  49.7 52.6 56.4 57.7 
Poland  41.8 42.9 43.5 43.9 
Slovak 
Republic 
41.0 42.1 44.0 45.5 
E U - 1 5       

















Source: OECD, Tax data base, 2000-02 
 
The higher the costs of labour, the lower is the incentive for labour demand in the 
official economy and the higher is the incentive to shift demand to the informal sector. 
In almost all studies
11, it has been found that an increase of the tax and social 
security contribution burden is one of the main causes for the increase of the shadow 
economy. Since taxes affect labour-leisure choices, and also stimulate labour supply 
in the shadow economy, or the untaxed sector of the economy, the distortion of this 
choice is a major concern of economists. The bigger the difference between the total 
cost of labour in the official economy and the after-tax earnings (from work), the 
greater is the incentive to avoid this difference and to work in the shadow economy. 
Since this difference depends broadly on the social security system and the overall 
tax burden, they are key features of the existence and the increase of the shadow 
economy. But even major tax reforms with major tax rate deductions will not lead to a 
substantial decrease of the shadow economy. They will only be able to stabilize the 
size of the shadow economy and avoid further increases. Social networks and 
personal relationships, the high profit from irregular activities and associated 
investments in real and human capital are strong ties which prevent people from 
transferring to the official economy.  
 
An increase of the shadow economy leads to reduced state revenues which in turn 
reduces the quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services. Ultimately, 
this can lead to an increase in the tax rates for firms and individuals in the official 
                                            
11 See Thomas, 1992; Lippert and Walker, 1997; Schneider, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2003a; 
Schneider and Enste, 2000 and 2002; Johnson et al., 1998a,1998b; Tanzi, 1999 and Giles, 1999 just 
to quote a few recent ones.    9 
sector, quite often combined with a deterioration of the quality of public goods (such 
as public infrastructure) and administration, with the consequence of even stronger 
incentives to participate in the shadow economy. Johnson et al. (1998b) show that 
smaller shadow economies appear in countries with higher tax revenues, if achieved 
by lower tax rates, fewer laws and regulations and less bribery facing enterprises. 
Transition countries have higher levels of regulation leading to a significantly higher 
incidence of bribery, higher effective taxes on official activities and a large 
discretionary framework of regulations and consequently to a higher shadow 
economy. The overall conclusion is that “wealthier countries of the OECD, as well as 
some in Eastern Europe find themselves in the ‘good equilibrium’ of relatively low tax 
and regulatory burden, sizeable revenue mobilization, good rule of law and corruption 
control, and [relatively] small unofficial economy. By contrast, a number of countries 
in Latin American and the Former Soviet Union exhibit characteristics consistent with 
a ‘bad equilibrium’: tax and regulatory discretion and burden on the firm is high, the 
rule of law is weak, and there is a high incidence of bribery and a relatively high 
share of activities in the unofficial economy.“ (Johnson et al. 1998a p. I). The 
evidence of the bribery in Central and Eastern states, as well as Former Soviet Union 





Regulations, which enterprises have to apply, are nothing else than costs to the 
enterprises and hence directly influence labour demand. This concerns the 
regulations on hiring and dismissals, working time and other non-standard forms of 
employment. Generally speaking, the Estonian labour market has been judged as the 
most flexible by various authors (see e.g. Rashid, Rutkowsky, 2001, Cazes, 
Nesporova, 2001) – job destruction and creation rates are even higher than the EU-
15 average. Latvia, on the other hand, has very strict regulations. Although labour 
law lays down only the minimum requirements, the social partners have the right to 
develop more detailed provisions concerning mutual rights and obligations. Strict 
regulation can be observed in the Slovak Republic compared to other transition 
countries, but they are far less strict than in Italy, Spain or Portugal. In Poland, job 
turnover is similar to that in relatively regulated labour markets (such as Germany), 
but substantially lower than in flexible ones such as the UK or USA, due to the strict 
employment protection legislation and the presence of strong trade unions.  
The increase of the intensity of regulations (often measured in the numbers of laws 
and regulations, like licenses requirements) is also an important factor, which 
reduces the freedom (of choice) for individuals engaged in the official economy.
12 
Regulations in this respect must be seen in a broader context, not only as labour 
market regulations, but also trade barriers, and labour restrictions for foreigners. 
Johnson et al. (1998b) find an overall significant empirical evidence of the influence 
of (labour) regulations on the shadow economy. This impact is clearly described and 
theoretically derived in other studies, e.g. for Germany (Deregulation Commission 
1990/91). Regulations lead to a substantial increase in labour costs in the official 
economy. But since most of these costs can be shifted on to the employees, where 
these costs provide another incentive to work in the shadow economy, where these 
                                            
12 For a (social) psychological, theoretical foundation of this feature, see Brehm, 1972, and for a (first) 
application to the shadow economy, Pelzmann, 1988.    10 
costs can be avoided. Empirical evidence supports the model of Johnson et al. 
(1997), which predicts, inter alia, that countries with more general regulation tend to 
have a higher share of the unofficial economy in total GDP. A one-point increase of 
the regulation index (ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 = the most regulated country), ceteris 
paribus, is associated with an 8.1 percentage point increase in the share of the 
shadow economy, when controlled for GDP per capita (Johnson et. al., 1998b, p. 18). 
They conclude that it is the enforcement of regulation, which is the key factor for the 
burden levied on firms and individuals, and not the overall extent of regulation - 
mostly not enforced - which drive firms into the shadow economy. Friedman et al. 
(1999) reach a similar result. In their study every available measure of regulation is 
significantly correlated with the share of the unofficial economy and the sign of the 
relationship is unambiguous: more regulation is correlated with a larger shadow 
economy. A one-point increase in an index of regulation (ranging from 1-5) is 
associated with a 10% increase in the shadow economy for 76 developing, transition 
and developed countries. 
 
 
(1) Employment protection legislation 
Regulations concerning the hiring and dismissals of employers can make it easy or 
difficult for firms to adjust their workforce. High costs of dismissals and strict rules 
concerning hiring (e.g. quotas for special groups) may smooth out employment 
dynamics over the economic cycle. However, this may be achieved at the cost of 
misallocation of human resources, to the extent that it encourages employees to 
reduce turnover costs by hoarding labour. For employees, strict labour regulation 
provides secure jobs and may increase their motivation. Employees may be willing to 
pay a premium, in form of lower wages, for having secure employment. On the other 
hand, the job security provided by employment protection legislation could also lead 
employees to reduce their work effort. Labour protection improves the situation of 
insiders compared to outsiders. Thus, low productive outsiders in particular may face 
even more difficulties in finding a job. Employment protection legislation in former 
communist countries has been found to result in lower job turnover, lower flows into 
unemployment and longer unemployment spells, but not to longer job tenure (see 
Nesporova, 2002). 
The CEECs
13 tend to be most restrictive concerning collective dismissals and least 
restrictive concerning temporary employment as can be seen from table 8 which 
depicts indicators of the strictness of employment protection legislation in some new 
EU Member States and candidate countries and old EU countries. In comparison to 
some old EU members, regulation seems to be in line with the more restrictive 
countries (such as Germany, Italy, France and Portugal) concerning regular 
employment, but less restrictive, close to less regulated countries such as the United 
Kingdom, where temporary employment is concerned. On collective dismissals, the 
CEECs can only be compared to Italy and Portugal. 
 











Czech Rep.  2.8  0.5  4.3  2.1 
Estonia 3.1 1.4  4.1  2.6 
                                            
13 CEECs = Central and Eastern European Countries; i.e. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia    11 
Hungary 2.1  0.6 3.4  1.7 
Poland 2.2 1.0  3.9  2.0 
Slovak Rep.  2.6  1.4  4.4  2.4 
Slovenia 3.4  3.1  4.8  3.5 
UK 0.8  0.3  2.9  0.9 
Germany 2.8  2.3  3.1  2.6 
France 2.3 3.6  2.1  2.8 
Italy 2.8  3.8  4.1  3.4 
Portugal 4.3  3.0 3.6  3.7 
Notes: 1) Indicators range from 0 to 4 according to degree of strictness. 2) Weighted average of 
indicators for regular contracts, temporary contracts, and collective dismissals. 3) Rankings increase 
with strictness of employment legislation. 
Source: Knogler 2002 and Worldbank, 2002 
 
The termination of a contract is usually connected with costs for the employer which 
can be divided in two groups: first, the severance benefits paid directly to the 
employee, and second, costs imposed from outside on the employer, such as 
information procedures or negotiations with trade unions. The notice period for the 
termination of a contract (two months on average) tends to be much longer in the 
CEECs than the (old) EU average (12.3 days). The grounds for terminating a 
contract are limited. Usually termination is prohibited during justified periods of 
absence and for pregnant women. Disabled individuals tend also to have special 
regulations concerning dismissal. When an employee is dismissed, notification to a 
third party (labour office and/or trade union) is generally required without the 
necessity of receiving permission from this third party. This is broadly in line with EU-
15 practice.  
Laws about severance pay tend to play the greatest role in countries where 
unemployment benefits are low. These countries require formal sector employers to 
pay benefits when permanent employees are dismissed. The typical amounts often 
correspond to between six and twelve monthly wages for tenured workers. Both the 
severance pay and the notice period tend to increase stepwise with the length of the 
employment period in the firm. In some countries, support for job search must be 
given by the dismissing enterprise.  
 
Regulations aimed at the integration of and providing job chances for disadvantaged 
groups often achieve the opposite results: Enterprises may choose between a 
special quota of disabled workers or a levy in Poland as well as in Austria. In both 
countries, most enterprises vote for the latter. Latvia e.g. imposes quotas on 
employers concerning women re-entering the labour market, for labour market 
entrants, ex-convicts and workers less than five years from retirement age. All 
together this touches around one third of the labour force.  
 
(2) Working time 
Working time flexibility is one way to decrease labour costs, especially if overtime is 
considered. From the employee’s point of view, working time flexibility may lead to 
welfare gains resulting from a better match of actual working time and preferences. 
The availability of part time and fixed term contracts may induce more people to enter 
the labour market (in particular those who have to care for children or elderly 
persons) and may induce employers to increase labour demand. Moreover, these 
forms of work provide a way for new labour force entrants to achieve experience. 
Their advantage lies in the greater flexibility in organising production schedules and 
in the more advanced possibilities for reacting to variations in demand.    12 
The degree of working time flexibility is varied across the CEECs. Low flexibility can 
be observed in Bulgaria and in Lithuania. In most countries, a shift away from regular 
full-time wage employment, which is still the most prevalent form, to irregular time-
limited and flexible employment arrangements, including self employment, has been 
taking place and is still on-going. Normal working time normally corresponds to a 40-
hours working week and shorter working periods for certain sectors. Overtime is 
usually restricted and an additional premium has to be paid. Special restrictions are 
applied to certain groups, such as young persons, pregnant women or minors. 
 
 
Non-standard employment as a % of total employment is characterised by a wider 
spread in the new EU Member States and candidate countries than in the old EU 
Member States. Part-time employment is in none of the CEECs more pronounced 
than in the Netherlands, the EU-15 country with the highest part-time share, and is 
less pronounced in the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria and Hungary than in Greece, the 
EU-15 country with the lowest part-time share. Several eastern countries (e.g. 
Lithuania, Romania) have only recently changed legislation in order to increase 
incentives for and provide flexible forms of part-time work.  
 
Table 9: Non-standard employment as a % of total employment 2002 




Bulgaria 2.5  5.3 
Czech Republic  4.9  8.1 
Estonia 7.7  2.7 
Hungary 3.6  7.3 
Latvia (2000)  11.3  6.7 
Lithuania (2001)  9.7  6.3 
Poland 10.8  15.4 
Romania 11.6  1.0 
Slovak Republic  1.9  4.9 
Slovenia 6.1  14.2 
EU-15    









Source: European Commission, 2003a 
 
The incidence of fixed-term contracts is clearly below the lowest EU-15 value in the 
Slovak Republic, Estonia and Romania. Several European countries limit the use of 
fixed-term contracts to certain maximum periods, and fixed-term agreements are 
limited in about one-third of collective agreements in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic and in almost half in Poland, thereby strengthening 
the position of insiders at the cost of outsiders. 
 
In Bulgaria, the proportion of fixed term contracts amounted to 1/3 of all contracts in 
mid-2000 according to trade unions. Due to the application of the seniority principle, 
fixed-term contracts are characterised by lower wages. Such contracts seem to be 
widespread for unskilled workers in some sectors (e.g. forestry and tourism) in 
Romania. Increasing reliance on alternative forms of labour contracts is observed in    13 
Poland, particularly in sectors that account for most of the growth in employment over 
the last few years. These alternative forms are, however, not new – private, 
temporary labour contracts were already concluded under central planning in the 
1980s. 
 
3.1.3 Self employment and entrepreneurship 
The starting point for the enterprise sector in the former centrally planned economies 
of Central and Eastern Europe was not encouraging. Most enterprises were state 
owned and in most countries heavy manufacturing dominated. The change in the 
enterprise structure during the last decade has been impressing. The business sector 
is thriving in most CEECs. The private sector has increased significantly over the last 
decade, but in a number of countries the private sector is still relatively small. In 
Latvia, Romania and Slovenia, the public sector still accounted for one third of GDP 
or more in 2001 and only in Estonia, the Slovak Republic and Hungary the private 
sector produced more than 80% of GDP. The relatively small private sector in some 
countries may indicate a lack of competition and room for efficiency gains.
14 
 
SMEs are still to be developed and are seen as an important job motor. 50 to 60% of 
all employees in the countries concerned work for small enterprises with less than 50 
employees. Most self-employment in the new EU Member States and candidate 
countries is concentrated in agriculture, where private initiative was tolerated even in 
the Communist area, and in the services sector.  
 
So far, a favourable climate for entrepreneurship has emerged, but improvements in 
the administration and local government are needed to support business in general 
and SMEs in particular. Barriers to entry and exit remain in some sectors and 
administrative burdens are heavy in several countries. There may still be a 
substantial amount of red tape preventing start-ups to thrive and grow.  
 
In the new EU Member States and candidate countries, self employment is not a 
strategy for the unskilled, but rather a labour market choice that brings high rewards. 
Enterpreneurs are consequently one group of winners of the transition. In all new EU 
Members and candidate countries, the self-employed account for the largest share of 
individuals in the top consumption group. The share of self employment is similar to 
the (range of) ratios in the old Member States (EBRD, 2000).  
 
Table 10: Self employment in % of total employment, 2001 
Bulgaria 13.7 
Cyprus 20.6 







Slovak Republic  8.4 
                                            








Source: European Commission, 2002 
 
 
3.2. Labour supply 
Labour supply is heavily influenced by the tax-benefit system, as people calculate 
whether it pays off to be in work instead of receiving unemployment (and/or other 
types of benefits). Especially for unemployed persons, the decision is complex. Their 
decision, whether to search for a job or not, may also depend on their experiences on 
the labour market. Active labour market policy, in general or specifically targeted to 
the needs of special groups which tend to be disadvantaged on the labour market, 




The high incidence of job shedding in the transition period has led to the introduction 
of an unemployment insurance system in all new EU Member States and candidate 
countries. The design of the tax-benefit system, comprising also social assistance 
and early retirement schemes, is of crucial importance. Generous benefit systems 
together with high taxes provide little incentives to search or take up a job – at least 
in the formal sector. The incentives to work in the informal sector will increase in a 
system with generous benefits and high taxes. 
  
(1) Net replacement ratios and incentives 
Net replacement ratios compare the various (cash) benefits made available to those 
without work (net of taxes) with potential in-work income and hence are a good 
indicator for incentives to take up work that are embedded in tax-benefit systems. Net 
replacement ratios are currently only available for those countries which are 
members of the OECD – i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic.  
 
Table 11: Net replacement ratios (in the 1
st month of unempl., after a waiting 
period) 
  APW wage level  66.7% of APW wage level 












Czech Rep.  49  67  70  71  66  69  70  72 
Hungary 48 48 60  61 65  65 75  76 
Poland   36  43  46  47  53  62  58  67 
Slovak Rep.  79  77  78  80  77  75  77  79 
EU-15: 
































Ita    15 
Source: OECD, 2002a. 
APW = average production worker 
Example how to read the table: An unemployed single person in the Czech Republic receives benefits 
at the level of 49% of his in-work-income. When in work, this person earns 67% of the average wages 
of full-time production workers in manufacturing. If he or she earns two thirds of an APW wage, the 
benefits amount to 66%. 
 
The variation in net replacement ratios is very high across the (old) EU with a spread 
of between 40 and more than 50%-points. As regards the CEECs, the lowest net 
replacement ratios are recorded in Poland and the highest in the Slovak Republic, 
where the ratios exceed the median value for the (old) EU countries for average 
wage earners. The additional benefits granted for an unemployed person’s family 
tend to increase the net replacement ratios more than in EU-15 countries. The 
difference in net replacement ratios between single workers earning the average 
production worker wage and those earning only two thirds of the average wage 
seems to be greater in the new EU Member States and candidate countries than in 
the old EU Member States.  
Table 12 shows the net replacement ratios for the same groups of countries and 
family types for long term benefit recipients. 
 
Table 12: Net replacement ratios for long term benefit recipients 
  APW wage level  66.7% of APW wage level 












Czech  Rep.  37 60  80  74  54 84 100  96 
Hungary 28 28  38  40  28 28  39  41 
Poland    33 50  74  56  48 72  93  81 
Slovak  Rep.  38 62  80  60  54 90 100 100 
EU-15: 

































Source: OECD, 2002a. 
 
Net replacement ratios for those unemployed with children are higher for long term 
benefit recipients than for persons in the first month of unemployment in the Czech 
and the Slovak Republics and in Poland. This might be problematic in so far as 
incentives for long term unemployed to seek a job should be stronger, whereas at the 
start of an unemployment spell, benefits could be more generous. In order to 
increase the efficiency of the allocation of labour resources and to improve the match 
of labour demand and supply, some frictional unemployment may be deemed 
beneficial. Net replacement ratios are particularly high in some countries, in general 
the situation in the CEECs is not extraordinary.  
 
 (2) Design of tax-benefit systems 
At the start of transition when unemployment benefit systems were newly introduced, 
they were designed to be relatively generous both in terms of the amount paid and in 
terms of duration. As unemployment increased, the systems had to be revised in 
order to remain sustainable and to allow them to activate jobseekers (Boeri and 
Terrell, 2002).  
Concerning the employment conditions governing eligibility for unemployment 
benefits, the requirement concerning previous employment duration varies a great    16 
deal in both groups of countries. The conditionality in the Czech Republic is the same 
as that of Germany. The Slovak Republic seems to be more restrictive with a 
requirement of 24 months of employment in 3 years. A waiting period does not exist 
in half of the old EU Member States and, in the others, it ranges between 3 and 8 
days, with the CEECs being in the same range. 
The payment rate (% of previous gross/net income) in the old EU lies between 40 
and 90% with a median value of 70%. Unemployment systems in the CEECs tend to 
be less generous on average than in the old EU. Poland is a particular case in point, 
having a flat rate, like Ireland and the UK. Finally, the unemployment benefit in the 
old EU is granted for periods between 6 months in the UK and Italy and 60 months in 
France, the Netherlands and Denmark. The median value of duration amounts to 12 
months. The eastern countries tend to be much less generous than the old EU 
countries, where duration of benefits is concerned, with the shortest duration of 4 
months in Bulgaria and the longest in Poland of 18 months. 
 
 
Generally speaking, the unemployment benefit systems in the new EU Member 
States and candidate countries do not deviate too much from the old EU systems, 
bearing in mind the strong degree of heterogeneity in both groups of countries. As for 
other benefit systems, social assistance and/or unemployment assistance schemes 
exist in most countries. Mostly, unemployed persons are eligible to participate in such 
schemes after termination of unemployment benefits or in cases where they are not 
at all entitled to receive unemployment benefits. In most countries of both groups, 
unemployment assistance (paid when unemployment insurance is exhausted) and 
social assistance are given without a limit on duration. Exceptions to this trend 
include Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. A subsistence 
allowance increases the disposable income to the “subsistence level” in Estonia, 
which under certain circumstances has lead to an income level above the 
unemployment benefit, which has negative effects on the incentives to search for a 
job. The social assistance benefit for a single person in 1998 amounted to 10% of the 
average wage in Romania, about 15% in the Baltic countries, over 20% in Hungary, 
about 33% in the Czech and Slovak Republic. These ratios were exceeded by the 
values of Belgium and the UK (about 40%) and Finland, the Netherlands and 
Sweden (about 60%). 
 
The new EU Member States and candidate countries devote more resources to non-
employment benefits than the old EU countries. Generous non-employment benefits 
decrease the incentives for low productivity workers to search and accept a job by 
increasing their reservation wage. On the other hand, the relatively generous benefit 
systems helped to encourage structural change and to reduce income inequality 
(Boeri and Terrell, 2002). 
 
Early retirement schemes are sometimes used as response to the decline in 
employment. This is particularly true for the Czech Republic. In Poland 12% of the 
registered unemployed receive pre-retirement benefits and the share is on an upward 
trend. The system was introduced in order to release jobs for young people and is 
rather generous, providing between 120 and 160% of the unemployment benefit. No 
early retirement system exists in the Slovak Republic. In some countries, e.g. the 
Czech Republic, disability benefits provide a more generous alternative to social 
allowance, particularly for older workers, and are used as an alternative to early    17 
retirement. Early retirement schemes were reduced during the transition period as 
they overburdened public finances when unemployment and economic inactivity 
rose. Some countries, therefore, have made efforts to increase the retirement ages 
(Nesperova, 2002). 
 
(3) Tax burden on labour 
The tax burden on labour and the general tax burden are rather high in most CEECs. 
Thus, they share one of the main problems with the old EU Member States. Tax 
rates on gross wage earnings (plus employee and employer social security 
contribution as a percentage of labour costs) for a low-wage earner show 
pronounced differences in this tax burden, ranging from a tax rate of 43.5% in 
Romania to 35.5% in Bulgaria in 2002. Only in two countries was the tax rate on low 
wage earners lower than the EU-15 average.  
 
Table 13: Tax rates on low wage earners 2002 
Bulgaria 35.2 
















Source: Eurostat, May 2004 
Tax rates are calculated for a single person without children. When in work, this person earns 67% of 
the average wages of full-time production workers in manufacturing. The tax wedge on labour cost 
calculates the income tax on gross earnings plus the employee’s & employer’s social security 
contributions and then expresses this sum as a % of the total labour cost for this low-wage earner. 
As described in chapter 3.1, taxes are an important component in explaining the 
shadow economy. This is true for both, labour demand and labour supply. In order to 
avoid the payment of taxes and social security contributions, workers have an 
incentive to supply their work in the informal rather than in the formal labour market. 
The most important factor in neoclassical models is the marginal tax rate. The higher 
the marginal tax rate, the greater is the substitution effect and the bigger the 
distortion of the labour-leisure decision. Especially when taking into account the 
income in the shadow economy, the substitution effect is definitely larger than the 
income effect
15 and, hence, the individual works less in the official sector. The overall 
efficiency of the economy is, therefore (ceteris paribus), lower and the distortion 
leads to a welfare loss (according to official GNP and taxation). But the welfare might 
also be viewed as increasing, if the welfare of those working in the shadow economy, 
were taken into account, too.
16 
                                            
15 If leisure is assumed to be a normal good. 
16 See Thomas, 1992, p. 134-7.    18 
 
 
3.2.2. Improving labour supply of unemployed persons 
Activation plays a crucial role in order to motivate unemployed persons to improve 
their efforts to find another job. Active labour market policy comprises preventive and 
employability-oriented strategies (training, retraining, work practice, a job, guidance 
or counseling). In most countriesof both regions, a shift from passive to active labour 
market policy can be observed during the last years. The shares of GDP spent on 
active labour market policies still tend to be rather low compared to the old EU 
countries, as can be seen in table 14.  
 
Table 14: Expenditures on active labour market policy (ALMP) 
 ALMP 
% of GDP 
year 
Bulgaria 0.35  2001 
Czech Republic  0.17  2000 
Estonia 0.08  1999 
Hungary 0.47  2000 
Latvia 0.16  2000 
Lithuania 0.09  2000 
Poland 0.20  2000 
Romania 0.15  2001 





EU-15    







Source: OECD (2002b) for old EU countries; OECD (2001) for CZ, Worldbank (2001) for PL; others: 
JAP. 
 
As to the special programmes, active labour market policies include measures, such 
as temporary job schemes, recruitment subsidies, support for self and training and 
re-training, which are also used in the old EU countries. Each country has a particular 
focus. Disabled persons belong to special target groups in several countries. As 
women tend to suffer from longer unemployment spells than men, training programs 
for unemployed women and for women returning to the labour market after a long 
break are offered in most countries. Concerning the effectiveness of active labour 
market policies, the evidence is mixed for the different countries and programmes.  
 
 
3.3. Matching demand and supply 
Wage policy and human capital endowments are crucial components for matching 
demand and supply. The wage must equal marginal costs for employers and 
marginal utility for employees. The wage level may influence the distribution of the 
formal and informal sectors. If the official wage level is very low, people may decide 
to work in the informal sector purely for subsistence reasons. They will often work in 
the shadow in addition to a legal job, but may also choose to work only in the 
informal economy. Human capital endowments are an important component of labour    19 
supply and demand, as the employees must have the requested skills in order to fulfil 





(1) Wage bargaining 
The discussion of how wage bargaining structures affect wage developments has to 
a large extent been shaped by the Calmfors and Driffill hypothesis. It predicts an 
‘inverted U’ relationship between unemployment and the degree of centralisation of 
wage bargaining. Fully centralised and fully decentralised bargaining both favour the 
employment situation: the first, because it can better take into account the economy 
wide consequences of the wage bargaining; the latter, because it can better reflect 
the productivity in the firm.  
Wage negotiations have gradually been developed in all former communist countries. 
There are, however, still important differences. In some countries (e.g. Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic), work councils have to be established which have to be 
involved in important business decisions. In Latvia and Romania, agreements on the 
sectoral level or on the enterprise level are automatically binding for all workers, 
regardless whether they are members of a trade union or not. In the Czech and the 
Slovak Republics, the government may decide to extend the collective agreements to 
non-organised workers. Table 15 indicates the degree of centralisation of wage 
negotiations. The dominant level for wage bargaining seems to be the enterprise 
level. 
 
Table 15: Degree of (de)centralisation of wage negotiations 
 national  sectoral  enterprise 
Bulgaria x  x  x 
Czech Rep.    x  x 
Estonia     x 
Hungary     x 
Latvia   x  x 
Lithuania     x 
Poland    x 
Romania     x 
Slovak Rep.  x  x   
Slovenia   x  x 
Sources: JAPs 
 
Membership of trade unions plays a crucial role in most wage bargaining systems. It 
has obviously decreased from the 100% coverage of the work force registered at the 
beginning of economic transition. By the end of the year 2000, the degree of trade 
unionisation was below 30% of the labour force. The role played by trade unions has 
changed from an “ideological” one to active participation in wage bargaining. 
Employer organisations represent on average 30-40% of industrial enterprises, or 
between 2 and 5% of the total number of enterprises (see European Commission 
2002). The strength of the trade unions varies a lot between different countries: from 
Poland at one end of a possible scale where firms are characterised by strong insider 
power of trade unions to Estonia at the other end of the scale, where employees 
have no right to demand negotiations. 
 
(2) Minimum wages    20 
Minimum wages can be seen from a social point of view of guaranteeing a certain 
minimum standard of living to the working population. From an economic point of 
view, minimum wages may guarantee a certain intensity of effort which workers are 
willing to undertake. On the other hand, the minimum wage may act as a barrier to 
the labour market entry of low-productivity workers whose productivity falls short of 
what would correspond to the minimum wage. Of course with the minimum wage, 
what matters is whether the level is prohibitively high in countries where the 
unemployment rate is high. Legally binding minimum wages exist in all CEECs. Their 
influence on the labour market varies however, as does the ratio of the minimum 
wage to the average wage. In Estonia, Hungary and Romania, the comparably low 
minimum wage, in combination with rather low unemployment benefits, does not 
appear to be a barrier for hiring additional employees. Involvement of the social 
partners in one way or another (be it consultation, a recommendation by the social 
partners or tripartite negotiations) is common in most countries. Several countries 
use an indexation system (e.g. the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) or base the 
increase of the minimum wage on forecasts of inflation and wage increases (e.g. 
Poland and the Slovak Republic). For the most part, no regional variation of the 
minimum wage is provided for, which seems to increase regional divergence in the 
labour market. 
 
At the start of the transition, almost all countries introduced legally binding minimum 
wages at levels similar to this in western countries (about 45 to 50% of the average 
wage). As nominal minimum wages remained unchanged for several years despite 
high inflation, the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage fell. Table 16 
provides an overview of the latest available data on the minimum wage in relation to 
the average wage (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). 
 
Table 16: Minimum wage  
 Minimum  wage  as 
% of average wage 
year 
Bulgaria 35.0  2001 
Czech Republic  34.0  2001 
Estonia 28.2 1999 
Hungary 40.0  2001 
Latvia 40.0  2000 
Lithuania 40 2001 
Poland 38.0  2000 
Romania 34.0  2002 
Slovak Republic  38.5  2000 
Slovenia 58.0  target  value 
EU-15   45.0 – 50.0   
Sources: OECD (2001) for CZ; IMF (2001) for ES, OECD (2002b) for HUN, others: JAPs 
 
(3) Wage dispersion 
Table 17 shows that wages cover a wide range both within and between the CEECs. 
This has implications not only on the acquisition of general and specific education 
and training by workers, but also for the efficient allocation of productive human 
resources.  
 
Table 17: Wage differences     21 
  Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 


















































* Wage in sector with lowest wage as a % of wage in sector with highest wage 
Source: own calculations using data from the OECD Data base 
 
Returns to education were low under central planning but this situation has changed 
dramatically in the course of the transition period. Differences in educational 
attainment account for one third of the explained variation in earnings. Inter-industry 
wage differentials are the second most important factor explaining earnings 
inequality. Gender is the third important factor, contributing very little to the 
differences, although it seems that gender gaps have increased in recent years. In 
contrast to returns to education, returns to work experience have not increased 
during the transition period. Quite the reverse, in most countries work experience is 
now less rewarded than previously (see Rutkowski, 2001, and Boeri and Terrell, 
2002). The decentralisation of the wage setting process has had a stronger impact 
on the wage structure than the speed of privatisation or other reforms. 
 
 
3.3.2. Regional aspects 
 
Regional unemployment is rather high in most countries with Slovakia and Bulgaria 
showing the widest gap between regions. The lowest and highest unemployment 
rates in 2001 vary between 2.0 and 32.8%, a range quite similar to that concerning 
EU-15 NUTS level 2 regions. So far, labour mobility has not contributed to reducing 
this problem.  
 
Mobility in central planned economies was restricted by the resident permit system 
and housing restrictions. Moreover, there was an attempt to stabilise the territorial 
distribution of the population by moving jobs to people (see Cazes, Nesperova, 2001 
and Rashid, Rutkowski, 2001). In the course of the transition, the closing of large 
enterprises in “one company towns” and the decline in agriculture have led to high 
unemployment rates in some areas. Labour mobility seems generally to be low, 
caused partially by high prices for new housing and a low housing stock and turnover 
in urban areas. In several countries (esp. in the Czech republic and Romania), 
commuting is common; however, relocation is not. In others (Hungary, Poland) the 
poor roadway systems are found to hinder internal migration. The attitude during 
communism, under which people had a job for life, has also contributed to low 
movement across regions within a country, despite relatively large regional economic 
differences (see IMF, 2001). The low degree of wage dispersion in regional respects 
is another factor to explain the low labour mobility. Fostering mobility is not only 
important from the point of view of regional development, but also in order to reduce 
the mismatch in the labour market. Concerning labour mobility, it was found to be 
more pronounced in terms of occupational than in terms of regional change (Svejnar, 
2002).    22 
 
Policies in the new EU Members States and candidate countries try to cope with the 
impediments to mobility through mobility grants for unemployed or persons with low 
income (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovak Republic), 
regional employment (Bulgaria) and education (Latvia) programmes, training services 
for businesses in slowly developing areas (Hungary), support for SMEs (Slovakia), 
reimbursement of recruitment costs for firms recruiting labour in a region with high 
unemployment (Hungary), the improvement of the transport system (Hungary) and 
subsidies for the construction of houses (Hungary and Slovakia). These measures 
cover the main European approaches to enhance mobility and tackle the special 
problems (such as those incorporated in the transport system) of the new EU 
Member States and candidate countries. 
 
 
3.3.3. Human capital 
Appropriate education and skills are a prerequisite for a competitive economy and 
there is a need to ensure that the skills acquired are suited to the needs of the 
economy. Job opportunities and wages tend to increase with skills. The virtue of 
lifelong learning is considered to go beyond economic competitiveness and job 
creation, by enabling people to cope with new challenges. One difficulty, especially 
faced in connection with education in the CEECs, is insufficient preparation for the 
transition from school to work. The hiring of school leavers often requires additional 
on-the-job training.  
 
Public expenditures on education in the CEECs seem to be more or less within the 
range of the GDP shares in the old EU countries, as can be seen from the following 
table.  
 
Table 18: Public expenditure on education as % of GDP 2001 
Bulgaria  3.7 
Czech Republic  4.4 
Estonia  6.8 
Hungary  5.2 
Lithuania  6.0 
Latvia  6.4 
Poland  5.4 
Romania  3.3 







Source: Eurostat, May 2004; *: 2000 
 
As to indicators concerning school education, all countries with the exception of 
Slovenia achieve a higher score than the EU-15 average in terms of average years of 
education.
17 
                                            
17 See Gundlach, 2002 and Knogler, 2002.    23 
 
Education seems to have concentrated too much on encyclopedic learning and less 
on the application of knowledge. Workers in centrally planned economies tended to 
have received extensive technical education, but foreign investors have perceived a 
lack of adaptability and flexibility. They have complained especially about 
deficiencies at the level of managerial and skilled employment. Skills – or production 
possibilities – are in a way complementary and substitutable with those in the old 
Member States. They are complementary, as the new Member States and candidate 
countries stand on a lower level of the "management ladder"
18. Moreover, their 
relative competitive advantage lies in the lower-skilled production as labour is a 
relative cheap production factor. However, they are partly substitutable as part of the 
western productivity will be or has been outsourced.  
Vocational training systems are now being developed and improved. They already 
existed in former times but were characterised by weak links between education and 
enterprises and in-depth specialisation. People in the CEECs do not yet perceive 
learning as lifelong process. Coherent strategies for lifelong learning are still lacking. 
Systems of continuing training are currently being set up.  
 
 
4.  Challenges for the new EU Member States and the candidate countries 
 
While challenges in the labour market of the new EU Member States and candidate 
countries do not differ fundamentally in nature from those in the old EU Member 
States, the problems are often more severe.  
 
As the restructuring will go on for several years, policy faces two challenges in order 
to absorb the transitional problems on the labour market: First, a well-functioning 
social security system, which should provide the "right" incentives, in order to care for 
those who are "victims" of the transition as they become unemployed. It seems that 
most countries have succeeded in building up a well-meshed social security net. At 
the beginning, in most countries it was even too generous and has early shown up 
that this cannot be financed. The main challenge for the new EU Member States and 
the candidate countries is to adapt the social security system in order to provide 
incentives for searching and taking up work. Second, policy should mitigate the 
consequences of labour shedding in industries and firms still in transition by setting 
incentives to attract firms and to set-up new firms. Together with growth- and 
stability-oriented macroeconomic policies, this would contribute to increase labour 
demand.  
 
Most new Member States and candidate countries tend to prioritise unemployment 
over inactivity. Low wages and the current situation on the labour market induce 
many unemployed to completely leave the labour force once their unemployment 
benefit entitlement is exhausted. Strategies how to bring people back to the labour 
market must therefore be developed. A long duration of unemployment implies a high 
risk of poverty, which is a completely new challenge in the CEECs. But also in-work 
poverty is a severe problem in many Eastern countries (European Commission 
2003b). Income distribution has grown more unequal during transition, although it is 
                                            
18 The "technology ladder" is a well-known terminus technicus in economics. In the CEECs, not 
technology but management skills are less developed than in the West.     24 
still comparable to the situation in the EU-15. The income position of low wage 
earners has deteriorated, while that of highly paid workers has improved. The new 
EU Member States and the candidate countries face the (relatively new) challenge to 
design distributional and social policies. 
 
In contrast to the regular economy, the informal sector has, been boosting during the 
transition period. Here again, incentives are the key to cope with this challenge. 
Policy has to decrease tax rates and to ease the regulatory burden on enterprises in 
order to bring the informal activities to the regular market. A higher share of regular 
activities would raise the tax base, which would partly compensate for the tax losses 
due to the decreased tax rates.  
 
Self-employment and entrepreneurship are important for creating employment, but 
cannot be directly influenced. Incentives must be set to make self-employment 
easier, but also awareness must be raised so that people face the opportunity of 
becoming an entrepreneur.  
 
Concerning working law, further adaptions to a more flexible labour market seem 
neccessary. The regulations in several cases mimic perfectly the (previous) Western 
law (especially in Germany and Austria) which has, however, been reformed 
markedly in recent years. The old EU Member States are more or less one step 
ahead in making the labour market more flexible. Bearing in mind, however, the 
starting point of the new and future Member States, progress in respect of labour law 
has been remarkable.  
 
The same can be said about wage setting processes. Here, matching demand and 
supply seems easier than in the old EU Member States. However, further reforms are 
deemed necessary especially in Slovenia concerning the minimum wages and in the 
candidate countries concerning the determination of wage levels.  
 
Finally, three issues will remain on the agenda for a very long time in the central and 
eastern European countries: First, increasing regional mobility is a long-term 
challenge as attitudes of people have to be changed and a very broad range of 
policies have to be addressed. Second, the adaption of human capital endowments, 
which may not only cover the reform of the educational system, must be mentioned. 
It is, indeed, important that the "right" contents are taught in schools, but learning 
must become a lifelong task in peoples attitude, from the cradle to the bare. Third, 
like almost all industrialised countries, the ageing of the society is a challenge which 
has to be taken up immediately, but problems can only be solved in the long-run. 
Especially the low employment rate of older people is a cause of concern. Therefore, 
incentives for older people to stay in the labour market must be set, as well as 
incentives for firms to keep older people in the labour market. 
 
Last but not least, labour market policy has to be accompanied by sound macro-
economic policy. A sustainable macro-economic framework is a necessary condition 
for growth and employment creation. 
 
    25 
5.  Effects of Enlargement on labour markets in East and West
19 
 
5.1 Enlargement and the European Employment Strategy 
Since the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on May 1 1999, incorporates an 
employment Title which outlines co-ordination of the European employment policy in 
the framework of the so-called "Luxembourg process". The European co-ordination 
on employment is part of the acquis communautaire which has to be transposed into 
national employment policies by the new Member States and candidate countries. 
Several countries have already before their accession to the EU developed 
employment strategy plans organised along the guidelines of the Luxembourg 
strategy which should be a good preparation for their future incorporation in the 
employment process. As the European employment strategy follows a very broad 
approach, the special problems of all countries – in the West and East – can be 
tackled in its framework. EU guidelines and directives with respect to labour law, 
which have a focus on equal opportunities for men and women, co-ordination of 
social security schemes, health and safety at work and labour law and working 
conditions, must be implemented as soon as a country becomes a member.  
 
Many elements of employment policies, which are common in the West, had to be 
introduced from scratch in the Eastern countries. These are, amongst others, Public 
Employment Services, social assistance, unemployment insurance and activation 
programmes. Working law had to be adapted to the needs of a market economy. 
Partly, these policies are very similar to the employment policy in the old EU Member 
States as they have been developed in co-operation with the old Member States in 
the framework of the so-called "twinnings programme". As all Member States (have 
to) co-ordinate their employment policies, the co-operation has proved a good way to 
proceed. However, in an enlarged EU, it seems even more unrealistic that the 
employment targets set at European Council meetings will be reached. This fact 
should not be judged as a political failure, but as a consequence of external (however 




5.2 Free movement of workers 
Free movement of workers is a principle of the single market. However, long 
transition periods have been imposed in the negotiations with the new Member 
States. The free movement of workers is completely suspended for the first two years 
after accession in many old EU Member States, especially those along the border to 
the accession countries. Thereafter, one of the old Member States can request an 
extension of this transition period for its territory, if this is deemed necessary, for 
three years initially and subsequently for two further years.  
The principle underlying the labour market reforms in the pre-accession periods is 
that labour markets in the new EU Member States have to be flexible and solve the 
problems on their own, as the role of mobility to ease these problems (especially 
concerning unemployment) can be restricted. Nevertheless, migration from East to 
West is one of the most important fear of the population in the old Member States.  
 
                                            
19 A comprehensive treatment of the effects of enlargement on the labour markets in the old Member 
States is beyond the scope of this paper.     26 
Mobility seems to be influenced by the high income differences between the new and 
future EU Member States and the old EU Member States. There are, however, 
several barriers to mobility which are more relevant for the mobility of people from the 
eastern countries than for the mobility of EU-15 nationals, such as difficulties in 
accessing the social security systems. Moreover, attitudes towards mobility seem to 
diverge among the CEECs. Czech workers are less mobile than Polish, for instance. 
Man, the young and the skilled workers are those most likely to change jobs, 
employers or countries. Economically disadvantaged regions may lose highly 
productive human resources which leads to a further increase of the disadvantages. 
The brain drain from the East was already visible before enlargement. The possibility 
of acquiring new qualifications may induce temporary migration, a phenomenon 
which is particularly observed for people with higher qualification. In sum, the effects 
of migration are far from being clear-cut: The effect on domestic demand in the 
CEECs depends on direct remittances sent to the home country. Moreover, the 
acquisition of better skills abroad raises the production potential when returning back 
home. The effects on the destination region are clearly positive, if there are labour 
shortages. If not, the wage level may face downward pressure. (Papapanagos – 
Vickerman, w.y.). As the development since the opening of the East, and in particular 
the creation of a free trade association of reforming countries with the EU, has 
shown, do most of these possible effects not materialise immediately. They emerge 
rather slowly and can thus be influenced to some extent by economic and social 
policies.  
 
A study by DIW (2000) concludes that accession to the EU will not lead to massive 
migration  from the East. Already before EU accession a continuous stream of 
migration to the west has emerged which is seen abating as a result of capital inflows 
and the ensuing rise in wage levels in the transition economies. Including the 
additional migration following from full freedom of personal movement of some 
336.000 persons the total stream may culminate at some 1,1 million persons. The 
additional flow of persons is seen to come down to some 42.000 persons by the year 
2020 (Breuss, 2000). A more recent study estimates a net increase in migration of 
residents from the CEEC-10 by 286.000 persons and a long-run stock of 3.7 million 
persons. The long-run potential is estimated to be between 2 and 4% of the 
population (Alvarez et al., 2003). 
 
However, migration may be of minor importance compared with the commuter 
problem. A number of people from the East will tend to move (at least periodically or 
on a daily or weekly basis) to the west in order to optimize their earnings 
opportunities. In border regions, a great part of migration is temporary and not 
permanent. The readiness of people from a nation to migrate internationally, seems 
to be negatively correlated with inter-regional cross-border movements. In border 
areas, this may temporarily disturb western labour markets and create adverse 
feelings of the working population against foreign workers. Restrictive policies in the 
west against the influx of foreigners will, however, impede the restructuring process 
on both sides of the border. Moreover, postponing the free movement does not 
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 During the transition period, job shedding took place in the public sector and in state-
owned enterprises. Employment creation in the private sector has clearly been 
lagging behind. Unemployment and economic inactivity are both important problems 
in the labour market. 
 
In the new and future EU Member States, challenges in the labour market do not 
differ too much from those in the old Member States. Problems are, however often 
more severe. Low employment rates and high unemployment rates remain serious 
problems. This poor labour market performance may be attributed for the most part 
to the break down in economic activity and the restructuring of the economy. The 
types of labour market policies used do, however, not deviate much from those in the 
EU-15. Each of the new EU Member States and candidate countries has its own 
special problems (e.g. high net replacement ratio in the tax benefit system or strict 
employment protection legislation), but the same can be said from the EU-15 
countries as well. Some problems, such as a high tax burden (and its implications for 
the formal and informal labour market) and the labour market implications of an 
ageing society, are shared between old and new/future EU members.  
 
Restrictions of labour mobility by the old EU members seemed to be politically 
necessary in order to make enlargement acceptable for the populations. From an 
economic point of view, these are, however, more of a hindrance than a help as they 
impede the restructuring process on both sides of the border. Bearing this in mind, 
politicians must indispensably use the transition period for an active and substantial 
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